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DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
Appellants state too broadly the ruling of the Dis-
trict Court and omit the particularity of the Order. 
This final Order, entered after protracted preliminary 
proceedings, arguments, attacks and defenses, issued 
.\Larch !.l, 1966 (R. 126-128). The statement of appel-
1 
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lants (Brief Page 2) is that the Restrictive Covenant,, 
m question related only to the original constructio;
1 
of homes in the subdivision. 
The Court's first Pre-Trial Order (R. 66, 6i) di1· 
tinguishes between construction covenants and ll~f 
covenants and rules that Covenant III is a buildino 
I 
restriction and that Covenant I is primarily a building 
restriction and should be interpreted as such particu· 
larly since no affirmative injunction or demolition wa1 
being sought. 
The Court's final Order disposing of the case pre· 
paratory to permitting an appeal holds that Covenant!. 
when interpreted with other covenants of the buildini 
restriction, pertains to matters of construction ano 
physical qualities, whereas, Paragraphs V, VI, VIII 
and IX of the Restrictive Covenants relate to use ol 
buildings once they have been constructed (R. 12ti·. 
127). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree generally with the statemen: 
1 
of facts in appellants' Brief (Pages 3 to 5). Theil! 
statement again suggests that only Covenant I of the 1 
Restrictive Covenants was before the Court wherea1 i 
it is the position of respondents that all of the Restric· 
tive Covenants must be read to interpret I. 
Appellants refer to a stipulation that the plaint'.fi" 
were not seeking relief by way of demolition by sayin, 
2 
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at Page 4 of their Brief that plaintiffs had asked to 
be relieYed "of a statement apparently made to the 
trial Court by their former counsel, Mr. Greenwood 
~~ * *." 
This statement appears under "Stipulations awl 
Court's Rulings" in the first Pre-Trial Order where 
the Court says: "And, as you are not seeking an affirm-
atiYe injunction which would require demolition, this 
may be a building-restriction only and not a use-rest·ic-
tion, even though the California case seemed to inler-
pret such words as a 'use-restriction' " ( R. 67). 
The Amended Pre-Trial Order sets out plainly 
that the action is one for damages, (R. 76 5 19) and 
the plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Pre-Trial Order (R. 
79-82) seeks no change from this ruling. 
The lengthy Brief filed by former counsel for 
plaintiffs does not complain of elimination of the demo-
lition issue and argues in favor of a cause of action for 
1 damages ( R. 90-108) . 
The respondents Craner rented the upstairs of 
' their home to their son and his wife from 1955 until 
1! 1 February, 1964; the lower floor to one Verlin Scott 
U'i from 1\Iay 10, 1964 to January 17, 1965 and to .Mr. 
I 
1e1 and Mrs. Don F. Choquette from April 1, 1965 to 
I' October 22, 1965 and thereafter (R. 56, 67). An addi-
c· i tional door giving access to the lower floor was installer1 
Oetober 1, 1964 at a cost of $100.00 (R. 56). 
f1 It appears from the Amended Complaint and from 
the Answer of respondents Gee to the Amended Com-
3 
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1 . i 
p amt that the Gee home was constructed immediate]) I 
after November 20, 1961 and that upon completion of , 
construction, it was occupied as a duplex (R. 36 , 7: : 
R. 45 ' 6). 
Indian Rock Subdivision at all times material \11 I 
the action and as of the 8th day of August, 1951, was I 
a part of Salt Lake. City a~d subj~ct to the provisions I 
of the Salt Lake City Zonmg Ordmance of which the , 
Court took judicial notice, (R. 77 ' 20) which fact was I 
not referred to in the Court's final Order (R. 126· 
127). See the discussion of this in the March 4th pro· : 
ceedings ( R. 163) . I 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial Court correctly ruled that the : 
Rest~ictive ~ovenants of the ~ndian Rock Subdivision \ 
permit contmued occupancy of duplexes under the facll I 
of this case. ' 
i 
Point II. No trial is necessary to interpret the : 
Restrictive Covenants. 
Point III. The Court did not err in refusing to i 
permit new counsel to change the theory of the action. ' 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT i 
LY RULED THAT THE RESTRICTIVE car I 
EN ANTS OF THE INDIAN ROCK SUBDIYl-
SION PERMIT CONTINUED OCCUPANCY 
4 
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OF THE DUPLEXES UNDER THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
All of the Restrictive Covenants must be read 
together in order to construe Covenant I. 
It must be borne in mind also that under Covenant 
III it is contemplated that during construction or prior 
thereto there will be approval of plans, design and loca-
tion which then provides "in any event, if no suit to 
enjoin the erection of such building or the making of 
such alterations has been commenced prior to the com-
pletion thereof, such approval will not be required 
and this Covenant will be deemed to have been fully 
complied with * * *." (R. 54). 
The words "permitted to remain" in Covenant I 
must therefore be read in connection with the remedy 
provided in Covenant III with the result that the 
building shall not "be permitted to remain" if action 
is taken prior to the completion of construction. 
The Court must also keep in mind that Covenants 
r, \'I, YIII and IX relate specifically to use of the 
property, distinguishing those from Covenants I, II, 
III and IY which relate to the construction of improve-
ments of the property. 
The Craner home has been occupied as a duplex 
from 1955 to the present time (Craner Deposition Page 
2-3; Answers to Interrogatories 2 and 3, [R. 56-57]) ; 
and the Gee home has been occupied as a duplex since 
its completion in 1961 (Gee Deposition Page 19). 
5 
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If there were nothing before the Court except tk , 
language quoted at Page 5 of appellants' Brief, then 
respondents agree that many courts and perhaps tht 
majority of courts have held that such language would 
cover use of improvements on property as well as the I 
construction thereof. This is the conclusion of Thomp- I 
son on Real Property, §3167, P. 166. An extensive I 
annotation at 14 A.L.R. 2d 1376, 1381, 1432 to 1436 I 
is quite equivocal. Respondents submit that Jordan 1' 
v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161, 21 S.E. 2d 206 (1962), is a case 
1 
close to the facts of the case at bar, whereas appellants ': 
do not cite any analogous case. I 
In support of respondents' admission that Coye- ~ 1 
nant I standing alone could well be interpreted in fayor 1 
of appellants, we note their case Walker v. Ha.Yleft, ! 
44 Cal. App. 394, 186 P. 622, where the words in the 
1
• 
covenant were: "no building or structure whatmr, I 
other than a first class private residence * * * shall be \ 
erected, placed or permitted on said premises." The I 
Court relied on the word "private" as proscribing a 1 
I 
"double house" and the word "permitted" was what r 
made this a use covenant. 
Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A.2d 308, 
provided that grantee "will not erect or maintain on the 
premises any building except one one-family dwelling 
house" and the Court found the word "maintain" to 
relate to use. The same word "maintain" was the basi) 
1 
of the decision in Simons v. JVork of God Corporation. i 
36 Ill. App. 2d 199, 183 N.E.2d 729 (1962), which ii 1 
6 
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rited in the same manner and on the same basis in 20 
Am . .J ur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions 
J 
qgo, P. 759, Note 7. 
Because of the words "permitted to remain" in 
CoYenant I it seems useless to embark upon considera-
tion of the general proposition which appellants make 
that some courts construe the words "construct" or 
"erect" or "shall be first class residences" as relating to 
construction as well as use whereas other courts give 
the opposite interpretation. 
Covenants I, II, Ill and IV relate generally to 
construction and Covenants V, VI, VIII and IX relate 
generally to use and therefore, the words "permitted 
to remain" could well be construed as a permission to 
remain during the process of construction only since 
there is no proscription of such use in Covenants V, 
n, Y III and IX. Respondents do not rely on this 
argument since it would be conjectural. There must 
be read in connection with Covenant I the more ex-
plieit Covenant III, which provides a specific proce-
dure to be followed by lot owners and builders and 
contemplates specific remedy by other lot owners in 
the subdivision but limits that remedy to the period 
during which there is construction. Plainly in this case 
we are well past that period and that is why demolition 
of the building was withdrawn as an issue by the original 
counsel for plaintiffs under the stress of argument at 
the Pre-Trials. Covenant I and the words "permitted 
to remain" a ppettr as part of the construction words 
7 
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and must be interpreted in the framework of the c011. 
struction process in Covenant III and tlistinguishcil r 
from the use covenants. I 
I 
20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Condition.y & Rcstrir·. 
tionJS, § 190, reflects the argument upon which respond· 
ents here rely. Section 189 points out a division of !ht 
authorities on whether a restriction concerning con· 
struction or building is applicable to later use of the 
1 
land and Section 190 reaffirms this by stating: I 
"Similarly, a covenant against the erection of I 
a building other than a one-family or single• 
dwelling house has been held to restrict the use· 
of the building when erected to one-family pur· 1 
poses. 
"Other courts, however, take the view that a 
restriction against the erection of a building 
other than a dwelling hqose is a restriction onl1 
as to the type of construction and not as to the 
subsequent use of the structure, particular/.~ 
where another restriction etvpressly prohibits cer· 
tain 1tses." (Emphasis added). 
In support of this view, this treatise cites the annota· 
tion at 14 A.L.R.2d, P. 1433, and the following cases: 
Neptune Park Association v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 
357, 84 A.2d 687, 690 (1951); Daniels Gardens, Int. 
v. Hilyard, 29 Del. Ch. 336, 49 A.2d 721, 723 (1946): 1 
Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268, 12ll [ 
A.2d 535, 538 (1956): .Jordan v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161, 7! 
1 
S.E.2d 206 ( 1952) ; and Ratkovich v. Randell Homes 
Inc., 403 Pa. 63, 169 A.2d 65 (1961). 
8 
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Ju Neptune Park, supra, the use of defendant's 
frnirteen room house as a common living place for fami-
licc; ''as held not a violation of a zoning ordinance limit-
ing use to single family dwellings or a restrictive cove-
nant against erecting buildings except dwelling houses. 
In reaching its decision, the Court stated: 
"That it was the intent of the parties to make 
this covenant apply only to the nature of the 
structure to be erected on the land and not to 
limit the use of it to occupancy by a single family 
is made abundantly clear by the fact that there 
is another covenant in the deed which does con-
trol the use of the property. We refer to the 
covenant that 'no public hotel, Pl!blic bathing 
house or club house, shop, store, saloon or other 
place of business shall be erected or maintained 
on the lot here conveyed.' This covenant does 
prohibit maintenance of the structures named 
as well as their erection. It prohibits uses which 
might otherwise be made of buildings which 
structurally were in the form of dwelling houses. 
If it had been the intent of the parties to prohibit 
the use of any dwelling house erected within the 
development by more than one family, they would 
naturally have so specified in this covenant in 
connection with the prohibition of hotels." 
Daniels Gardens, Inc. v. Hilyard, supra, involved 
a situation where the plaintiff owned all of a housing 
derelopment of 350 dwellings, many of which had been 
sohl and where two buyers had converted a living room 
into a delicatessen and grocery store, and into a pickup 
station for dry cleaning and laundr~', respectively. A 
single rlecd covered the entire tract and each lot therein 
9 
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and contained two restrictions pertinent here and whicli 
were considered by the Court: 
"1. All lots * * * shall be known and describe1I 
as residential lots * * * . No structure shall b. 
erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain 
on any residential building plot other than one 
single family dwelling * * *." 
"4. No noxious or offensive trade or activiti 
shall be carried on upon any lot nor shall all\:· 
thing be done thereon which may be or beco1~t 
an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood: 
In advising a Decree of Dismissal the Court considereil 
the contentions of the parties much as they are beini 
advanced in the case at bar, and with language almosi 
identical with our Covenants I and V, and noted that 
rules of strict construction apply and that words wilt 
be given their ordinary meanings, concluding: 
"As the words used in the first restriction art 
generally understood today, the restriction deah 
only with the type of structure and not with tli: 
use of such structure. * * * 
"Another reason exists which in part bulwarb 
the conclusion I have reached with respect to th:: 
first restriction. The fourth restriction explicitlr. 
enumerates certain uses of the lots which art~ 
prohibited. If the first restriction is to apply tn 
use as well as the character of the structure, thet 
what possible function will certain language ol 
the fourth restriction dealing with off ensiw trad 
serve?" 
The Court cited, as containing construction covenanb 
and use covenants as distinguished from each other tlir 
10 
.... 
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following cases: Carr, et al. v. Riley, et al., 198 Mass. 
70. 8-J< N.E. 426; Clark v .Jammes, et al., 87 Hun. N.Y. 
215, :3:3 N.Y.S. 1020; Goodhue v. Cameron, 142 App. 
Di''· 470, 127 N.Y.S. 120; Tannelle v. Hayes, et al., 
118 lHass. 339, 194 N.Y.S. 181, and also 155 A.L.R. 
1007, 1012. 
In Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, supra, 
the Court made this distinction between building cove-
nants and use covenants at Page 530 of 120 A.2d: 
"A building restriction and a use restriction 
are wholly independent of one another, and, in 
Yiew of the legal principles above stated, the 
one is not to be extended so as to include the other 
unless the intention so to do is expressly and 
plainly stated; to doubt is to deny enforcement." 
This language was with reference to what the Court 
held to be a building restriction in the following lan-
guage: 
" * * * shall be used only for the purpose of 
erecting thereon prinvate dwellings * * *." 
In Jordan v. Orr, supra, the plaintiff had been 
non-suited following trial by the Georgia District Court. 
'l'he facts were that the defendant had made a basement 
room into a kitchen and had then rented three rooms 
i and bath includiug the kitchen so that there were two 
entirely separate families in the dwelling. All deeds in 
the subdivision contained the same eleven restrictions 
of which the opinion quotes four. Two of these are as 
1, : follows : 
11 
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" (I) Said property shall be used onlr f111 
residential purposes with the un~erstanding th I 
110 duplex or apartment house is to be erectt: 
thereon, and shall not he used for cemetery, ]i11, 
pital, sanitarium, or any business purpose< 
" ( 3) No use to be made of said propertr. 11: 
any part thereof, which would constitute a llili 
sance or injure the value of any of the nei(rhhor· 
ing lots." b 
Restriction ( 5) dealt with cost of the residences to ik 
constructed and Restriction (I I) ga re all owners~ 
right to enforce compliance with the restrictive conl. 
nan ts. 
The Court held that installation of the kitchen m•j 
not such a structural change as to make the house : : 
duplex since it had not been one before. It held that thri 
first part of Restriction (I) applies to building anri: 
the latter part to use saying: Ii 
"Had the subdivider intended that eac11 resi· 
dence was to be used by only one family, tl1111 
could have been made clear by so stating in thn1 
part of the covenant dealing with the use of tl1
1 
property." 
And held that this covenant was not violated by occupy· 
ing a building as a residence and renting out a portion 
to another family. 
A similar rule is indicated by the summary statf· 
ment in I55 A.L.R. 1007 at 10I2 as follows: 
"In some cases where a portion of the coyernin 
restricted the 'erection' of structures, the court 
12 
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have held that the use was not to be considered 
as also restricted, where the covenant elsewhere 
enumerated specific business or occupations which 
should not be permitted qn the premises, and the 
use complained of was not one of those so ex-
cluded." Citing several cases. 
Respondents ask the Court to interpret the Indian 
Rock Subdivision Restrictive Covenants in the light 
of the foregoing principles, giving strict construction 
to the coyenants and the language thereof. 
Covenants I, II, III and IV seem plainly to relate 
to construction matters, Covenant Ill relating to ap-
proval of plans and objections to plans and suits to 
enjoin "the erection of such building or the making 
of such alterations" and providing that if no suit to 
enjoin is commenced prior to the completion of the 
structure "such approval will not be required and this 
Covenant will be deemed to have been fully complied 
with." 
Covenants V, VI, VIII and IX relate to use of 
the property and Covenant VII relates to moving a 
structure onto one of the lots. No issue is raised on this 
record under Covenants V, VIII and IX and Covenant 
\'II is not involved. Covenant VI also relates to use 
and requires more careful consideration. Covenant VI 
refers to use of basements which are apparently included 
as one of the possible "outbuildings" and use of a base-
ment "as a residence temporarily or permanently" is 
prohibited. Appellants have not argued that Covenant 
YI gives them a remedy; but the Court may inquire 
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into that possibility which seems to respondents tc 1 J 
appellants' strongest argument. ' 
The Statement of Facts refers to the houses 
1 
respondents as each having a "walk-out basement floor 
and then provides that each floor is independent], 
equipped as a residence and at Page 4 the Statenm 
says that the respondents have rented out the "basenm 
floors." 
In the Interrogatories submitted by the plaintin 
to the defendants Craner, the lower unit of the Cralli 
home was referred to as "the lower floor of your prern 
ises" and the "lower apartment" in the Interrogaton1 
1, 3 and 4 (R. 56-57). 
In the James F. Craner deposition the referem 
is to "upstairs'', and "downstairs", Page 2 and 3 an 
also to the "lower portion" Page 3 and 4. One questio 
asked about reference in the building permit to "an 
of the basement rooms or basement area as being coc 
vertible into rooms under the permit" which Mr. Cram 
answered "I don't remember." 
In the Leland 0. Gee deposition the reference. 
to the "lower element" (Page 15). 
In his deposition, Earl R. Belnap, the buildt 
of the Gee home refers to the lower floor as a baseme1 ' 
at Pages 8, 9, 14 (where it is also referred to as tl11 
lower floor), 21, 23, (where it is also referred to i 
downstairs). At Page 30, this question was put to JI! r 
Belnap: 
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''.Q. As a matter off act, a good many of these 
spht-level houses that are one family dwellings 
look exactly like this, isn't that so?" 
and it was answered: 
"A. Oh, it could be. 
"Q. It's pretty hard to tell from the outside 
whether they're a duplex or a one-family dwell-
ing, isn't it? 
"A. Yes, that's why the neighbors shouldn't 
be complaining." 
And in all of the depositions the buildings are ref erred 
to as duplexes. 
Mrs. Vilate B. Gee in her deposition referred to the 
lower floor as "downstairs" (Page 15 and 25). 
Therefore, it fairly appears that the two homes of 
respondents are two-level homes, appearing similar to 
other homes in the subdivision which are also two-level 
1
, homes where neither level is below ground, except that 
at the back end or upper end, the lower floor terminates 
in the hill with no indication as to whether the upper 
floor so terminates in the homes of respondents or any 
of the other homes in the subdivision. 
i\, The covenant seems to be directed at a custom 
e1 with some people to construct a basement with a tem-
t!1, porary roof on it and dwell in that basement until the 
· ·: home can be completed, which is a sort of sub-standard 
)I residence in a high class subdivision. The covenant is 
susceptible of the interpretation also that an undesir-
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abl~ bas~ment or a hdow ground basement should"" I 
be mhab1ted as a residence. Nothing in Covenant \[ 
refers to apartments or self-contained units in hai. 
ments. It would therefore appear that when the 0111 
portion of a house that exists is the basement, it ,, 1 
contrary to the covenant to use that basement for re1,, 
dential purposes, as though it were a tent, trailer, shac! 
or garage or "other outbuilding". Exhibit I of t!ii. 
Leland Gee deposition is a photograph of the fron1 1 
of the Gee home and should be produced for the beneti: 
of the Court. 
In summary the respondents submit that the issw 
of demolition was eliminated as a concession to propt. 1 
interpretation of the covenants. Construction of a du 
plex is proscribed by Covenant I but is approved h1' 
inaction under Covenant III. Use of the complett:, 
building must be measured by Covenants Y, YI, Ylll' 
and IX, none of which applies. Had the preparer 11 
the covenants desired to prohibit use of buildiugs 
duplexes Covenant VI should have been expanded tr 
cover such use whether the double units be side by si1L 1 
front and back, or upper and lower. The reference t''i 
"basements" along with garages and outbuildings col!'. 
templates a basement unit without a superstructurr ! 
since otherwise lower levels of two-level homes coulii i 
not be used for residential purposes either as self-c1n1·. 
tanied units or as part of larger units. i 
l 
This gives meaning to all the covenants and rec0i 
1 
nizes the logical treatment of constructoin, procedur i 
(Covenant III) and use of the property and buildinc 
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POINT II. NO TRIAL IS NECESSARY TO 
IXTERPRET THE RESTRICTIVE COYE-
XANTS. 
Appellants contend that a trial of the case is needed 
as an aid in interpreting the Restrictive Covenants, 
citing Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Ut. 
Zd 35, 376 P.2d 940. That case involved a controversy 
between parties to a restrictive covenant and states 
that the surrounding circumstances may be received in 
eridence. Here, all of the respondents were subsequent 
purchasers of the lots and took no part in any nego-
tiations leading up to the preparation of the covenant. 
"In an action to enfor~e a restrictive covenant, 
evidence of the intent of the parties with regard 
to the creation and extent of the restriction is 
limited to the instrument itself, unless the mean-
ing of the language used is uncertain or ambigu-
ous, in which case the surrounding circumstances 
may also be taken into consideration." 20 Am. 
J ur. ~, Covenants, Conditions & Restriction.~, 
§322. 
The evidentiary circumstances indicated there, are 
whether similar restrictions were inserted in other deeds, 
whether there were buildings at the time, abstracts of 
title, and similar things. These matters are all before 
the Court in this action in the form of exhibits which 
include plat of the subdivision with its date, the dates 
of acquisition of the lots by the various parties involved, 
depositions of the defendants, the deeds by which the 
defendants took title, and the Salt Lake City Zoning 
Clrrliuarn:e which antedated the Restrictive Covenants. 
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The Court must first determine whether it regard, 
the Covenants as ambiguous or uncertain, and if ~ 11 _ 
it should then determine whether the exhibits and tli· 
depositions before the Court are sufficient to supph 
the needed circumstances to assist in interpreting fa 
covenants. 
At Page 15 of their Brief, appellants state tlrnt 
it is the respondents' view that the Covenants are am· 
biguous as to whether they restrict use as well as con 
struction. This is not the view of respondents. It 11 
our view that the Covenants must be strictly construe1i 
and that as so interpreted they are not ambiguous a111I 
that the surrounding circumstances need not be delrei 
into by the Court. 
At Page 13 of appellants' Brief it is stated th:ti 
"Plaintiffs have invested in their dwelling sites a111I 
improvements in reliance upon covenants providing for 
restriction to single family occupancy." The only fart, 
in evidence belie this statement. The Affidavit in Sup· 
port of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgmew 
shows that most of the plaintiffs obtained deeds to thcr 
property after the Craners and the construction r,; 
their home for two family occupancy (R. 53). 
It is doubtful whether a trial would shed furthe: 
light on the surrounding circumstances. 
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT Elli: 
IN REFUSING TO PERMIT NE'V COUNSEL 
TO CHANGE THE THEORY OF THE ,\l 
TION. 
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At Page 6 of their Brief, appellants misstate the 
position of respondents. Respondents do not admit 
that plaintiffs have any remedy at the present time to 
haw either of the houses demolished or altered. Our 
position is not so narrow as to contend that someh°''. 
the plaintiffs have lost a remedy to have the buildings 
demolished. The plaintiffs' former counsel were con-
vinced that under the Restrictive Covenants they had 
no effective cause of action for demolition of the build-
ings, and therefore at Pre-Trial withdrew that as an 
issue. The position of defendants on this matter is that 
there is no basis for relief for demolition of the build-
ings under the Restrictive Covenants. Under Covenant 
III this remedy was available prior to the construction 
of the house, when the plans were filed and open to 
view, and during the course of construction and not 
thereafter. Secondly, plaintiffs desired no issue on this 
partly because they believed their cause of action was 
deficient and partly also because they really were not 
seeking to change the houses of defendants but only 
the use of those houses. And thirdly, since plaintiffs 
acting through their counsel went through the Pre-
Trial procedure without making an issue on this point 
and specifically advised the Court that they did not 
desire this as an issue, there is no occasion at the present 
time to change this commitment. 
Once the Pre-Trial Order has been made, the modi-
fication of it is for the discretion of the Court. There 
is no obligation of the Court to permit new counsel to 
change the position of the parties after there has been 
full argument. 
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The Amended Complaint plainly seeks relief J,; I 
demolition or alteration of the houses of defendant, 
At Pre-Trial conferences it is appropriate to limit tht 
issues of fact and law (Rule 16 Utah Rules of Ciril 
I 
Procedure), particularly when there is a Motion for ' 
I 
Summary Judgment as was the case here. Counsel were , 
free to make a record on this point and presene it for 
this Court on appeal had they desired to do so. Present 
counsel suggests that former counsel were derelict i11 
abandoning the issue. However, the parties are bou111I 
by actions of their counsel and as the Court commente1i 
in the proceedings here on March 4, 1966, the issrn 
of demolition was withdrawn because former counsel 
believed they could not prevail on it under the Con 
nants and that the case had been thoroughly explored 
by former counsel and the law does not favor the shift· 
ing of lawyers to get a new chance at old questions arnl 
noted also that other persons had intervened in belrnlf 
of the plaintiffs which the Court did not desire to en· 
courage (R. 157 to 158). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court properly limited the issues in tht 
case through the Pre-Trial procedure and made a soun1l 
interpretation of the Restrictive Covenants as limitini 
1
. 
duplexes at the construction stage. 
There is no need for a trial in the case as the cir · 
cumstances surrounding the execution of the Covenant· 
were before the Court bv Answers to Interrogatoriei. 
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'I, 
depositions of the parties, and exhibits offered at the 
Pre-Trial. 
There was no artifice or misunderstanding in elimi-
nation of the demolition issue and no obvious merit in 
it under the facts of this case. 
The Order of the District Court dismissing the 
Complaint should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART 
By Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
Attorneys for Respondents Craner 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ALAN H. BISHOP 
Attorney for Respondents Gee 
201 State Exchange Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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